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Abstract
Adversarial examples and poisoning attacks have become indisputable threats to the secu-
rity of modern AI systems based on deep neural networks (DNNs). The Adversarial Robustness
Toolbox (ART) is a Python library designed to support researchers and developers in creating
novel defence techniques, as well as in deploying practical defences of real-world AI systems.
Researchers can use ART to benchmark novel defences against the state-of-the-art. For devel-
opers, the library provides interfaces which support the composition of comprehensive defence
systems using individual methods as building blocks.
The Adversarial Robustness Toolbox supports machine learning models (and deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs) specifically) implemented in any of the most popular deep learning
frameworks (TensorFlow, Keras, PyTorch and MXNet). Currently, the library is primarily
intended to improve the adversarial robustness of visual recognition systems, however, fu-
ture releases that will comprise adaptations to other data modes (such as speech, text or
time series) are envisioned. The ART source code is released (https://github.com/IBM/
adversarial-robustness-toolbox) under an MIT license. The release includes code examples
and extensive documentation (http://adversarial-robustness-toolbox.readthedocs.io)
to help researchers and developers get quickly started.
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1 Introduction
The Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) is an open source Python library containing state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks and defences. It has been released under an MIT license and is avail-
able at https://github.com/IBM/adversarial-robustness-toolbox. It provides standardized
interfaces for classifiers using any of the most popular deep learning frameworks (TensorFlow,
Keras, PyTorch). The architecture of ART makes it easy to combine various defences, e.g. ad-
versarial training with data preprocessing and runtime detection of adversarial inputs. ART is
designed both for researchers who want to run large-scale experiments for benchmarking novel
attacks or defences, and for developers who want to compose and deploy comprehensive de-
fences for real-world machine learning applications.
The purpose of this document is to provide mathematical background and implementa-
tion details for the adversarial attacks and defences implemented in ART. It is complementary
to the documentation hosted on Read the Docs (http://adversarial-robustness-toolbox.
readthedocs.io). In particular, it fully explains the semantics and mathematical background
of all attacks and defence hyperparameters, and it highlights any custom choices in the imple-
mentation. As such, it provides a single reference for all the state-of-the-art attacks and defences
implemented in ART, whereas in the past researchers and developers often had to go through the
details of the original papers and compare various implementations of the same algorithm.
This document is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background and introduces math-
ematical notation. Section 3 gives an overview of the ART architecture and library modules. The
following sections cover the different modules in detail: Section 4 introduces the classifier mod-
ules, Section 5 the evasion attacks and Section 6 the evasion defences. Section 7.1 covers detection
of evasion attacks, while Section 8 detection for poisoning, and Section 9 the metrics. Section 10
details the wrappers for data generators. Finally, Section 11 describes the versioning system.
2 Background
While early work in machine learning has often assumed a closed and trusted environment, at-
tacks against the machine learning process and resulting models have received much attention in
the past years. Adversarial machine learning is a field that aims to protect the machine learning
pipeline to ensure its safety at training, test and inference time [36, 4, 7].
The threat of evasion attacks against machine learning models at test time was first highlighted
by [5]. [39] investigated specifically the vulnerability of deep neural network (DNN) models and
proposed an efficient algorithm for crafting adversarial examples for such models. Since then,
there has been an explosion of work on proposing more advanced adversarial attacks, on under-
standing the phenomenon of adversarial examples, on assessing the robustness of specific DNN
architectures and learning paradigms, and on proposing as well as evaluating various defence
strategies against evasion attacks.
Generally, the objective of an evasion attack is to modify the input to a classifier such that it
is misclassified, while keeping the modification as small as possible. An important distinction is
between untargeted and targeted attacks: If untargeted, the attacker aims for a misclassification
of the modified input without any constraints on what the new class should be; if targeted, the
new class is specified by the attacker. Another important distinction is between black-box and
white-box attacks: in the white-box case, the attacker has full access to the architecture and pa-
rameters of the classifier. For a black-box attack, this is not the case. A typical strategy there is to
use a surrogate model for crafting the attacks, and exploiting the transferability of adversarial
examples that has been demonstrated among a variety of architectures (in the image classifica-
tion domain, at least). Another way to approach the black-box threat model is through the use of
zero-order optimization: attacks in this category are able to produce adversarial samples without
accessing model gradients at all (e.g. ZOO [11]). They rely on zero-order approximations of the
target model. One can also consider a wide range of grey-box settings in which the attacker may
not have access to the classifier’s parameters, but to its architecture, training algorithm or training
data.
On the adversarial defence side, two different strategies can be considered: model hardening
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and runtime detection of adversarial inputs. Among the model hardening methods, a widely
explored approach is to augment the training data of the classifier, e.g. by adversarial examples
(so-called adversarial training [17, 30]) or other augmentation methods. Another approach is in-
put data preprocessing, often using non-differentiable or randomized transformation [19], trans-
formations reducing the dimensionality of the inputs [43], or transformations aiming to project
inputs onto the “true” data manifold [28]. Other model hardening approaches involve special
types of regularization during model training [38], or modifying elements of the classifier’s ar-
chitecture [44].
Note that robustness metrics are a key element to measure the vulnerability of a classifier with
respect to particular attacks, and to assess the effectiveness of adversarial defences. Typically such
metrics quantify the amount of perturbation that is required to cause a misclassification or, more
generally, the sensitivity of model outputs with respect to changes in their inputs.
Poisoning attacks are another threat to machine learning systems executed at data collection
and training time. Machine learning systems often assume that the data used for training can
be trusted and fully reflects the population of interest. However, data collection and curation
processes are often not fully controlled by the owner or stakeholders of the model. For example,
common data sources include social media, crowdsourcing, consumer behavior and internet of
the things measurements. This lack of control creates a threat of poisoning attacks where adver-
saries have the opportunity of manipulating the training data to significantly decrease overall
performance, cause targeted misclassification or bad behavior, and insert backdoors and neural
trojans [4, 34, 21, 18, 25, 26, 6, 33]. Defences for this threat aim to detect and filter malicious
training data [4, 3, 36].
Mathematical notation In the remainder of this section, we are introducing mathematical no-
tation that will be used for the explanation of the various attacks and defence techniques in the
following. Table 1 lists the key notation for quick reference.
Additionally, we will be using the following common shorthand notation for standard Python
libraries in code examples:
• np for Numpy
• torch for PyTorch
• tf for TensorFlow
• k for Keras backend (keras.backend).
The notion of classifier will be central in the following. By x ∈ X we denote the classifier
inputs. For most parts, we are concerned with classifier inputs that are images and hence assume
the space of classifier inputs is X ⊂ Rk1×k2×k3 , where k1 is the width, k2 the height, and k3 the
number of color channels of the image§. We assume that the classifier inputs have minimum
and maximum clipping values xmin and xmax, respectively, i.e. each component of x lies within the
interval [xmin, xmax]. For images, this interval is typically [0, 255] in case of 8-bit pixel values, or
[0, 1] if the pixel values have been normalized. For an arbitrary x ∈ X , we use clip(x, xmin, xmax)
to denote the input that is obtained by clipping each component of x at xmin and xmax, respectively.
Moreover we write ‖x‖p for the `p norm of x, and project(x, p, e) for the function which returns
among all x′ satisfying ‖x′‖p ≤ e the one with smallest norm ‖x− x′‖2. In the special case p = 2
this is equivalent to multiplying x component-wise with the minimum of 1 and e/‖x‖2, and in
the case p = ∞ equivalent to clipping each component at ±e.
By y ∈ Y we denote the classifier outputs, which we also refer to as labels. We always assume
the space of classifier outputs is Y = {1, . . . , K}, i.e. there are K different classes. For most parts,
we will consider classifiers based on a logit function Z : X → RK. We refer to Z(x) as the logits of
the classifier for input x. The class probabilities are obtained by applying the softmax function,
F(x) = softmax(Z(x)), i.e. Fi(x) = exp(Zi(x))/∑j∈Y exp(Zj(x)) for i ∈ Y . Finally, we write C(x)
for the classification of the input x:
C(x) = arg max
i∈Y
Fi(x),
§Typically k3 = 1 or k3 = 3 depending on whether x is a greyscale or colored image.
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Notation Description
X Space of classifier inputs
x Classifier input
X Random variable
xmin Minimum clipping value for classifier inputs
xmax Maximum clipping value for classifier inputs
clip(x, xmin, xmax) Function clipping x at xmin and xmax, respectively
‖x‖p `p norm of x
project(x, p, e) Function returning x′ with smallest norm ‖x− x′‖2 satisfying ‖x′‖p ≤ e
Y Space of classifier outputs (=labels)
K Cardinality of Y (note: we assume Y = {1, . . . , K})
y Label
Z(x) Classifier logits (ranging in RK)
F(x) Class probabilities (= softmax(Z(x)))
C(x) Classification of input x (also used to denote the classifier itself)
ρ(x) Untargeted adversarial perturbation
ψ(x, y) Targeted adversarial perturbation
xadv Adversarial sample
L(x, y) Loss function
∇xL(x, y) Loss gradients
∇Z(x) Logit gradients
∇F(x) Output gradients
x z Element-wise product
Table 1: Summary of notation.
which, since softmax is a monotonic transformation, is equal to arg maxi∈Y Zi(x). With slight
abuse of notation, we often use C(x) to denote the classifier itself.
An untargeted adversarial attack is a (potentially stochastic) mapping ρ : X → X , aiming
to change the output of the classifier, i.e. C(x + ρ(x)) 6= C(x), while keeping the perturbation
‖ρ(x)‖p small with respect to a particular `p norm (most commonly, p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}). Similarly,
a targeted adversarial attack is a (potentially stochastic) mapping ψ : X × Y → X , aiming to
ensure the classifier outputs a specified class, i.e. C(x+ ψ(x, y)) = y, while keeping the perturba-
tion ‖ψ(x, y)‖p small. We call xadv = x+ ρ(x) (or analogously xadv = x+ ψ(x, y)) the adversarial
sample generated by the targeted attack ρ (untargeted attack ψ). In practice, we often consider
xadv = clip(x+ ρ(x), xmin, xmax) (analogously, xadv = clip(x+ ψ(x, y), xmin, xmax)) to ensure the adver-
sarial samples are in the valid data range.
Finally, the following objects play an important role in the generation of adversarial samples:
• The loss function L : X ×Y → R that was used to train the classifier. In many cases, this is
the cross-entropy loss: L(x, y) = − log Fy(x).
• The loss gradient, i.e. the gradient ∇xL(x, y) of the classifier’s loss function with respect to
x.
• The class gradients, i.e. either the logit gradients ∇Z(x) or the output gradients ∇F(x)
with respect to x.
3 Library Modules
The library is structured as follows:
art/
attacks/
attack.py
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carlini.py
deepfool.py
fast gradient.py
iterative method.py
newtonfool.py
projected gradient descent.py
saliency map.py
universal perturbation.py
virtual adversarial.py
classifiers/
classifier.py
keras.py
ensemble.py
mxnet.py
pytorch.py
tensorflow.py
defences/
adversarial trainer.py
feature squeezing.py
gaussian augmentation.py
jpeg compression.py
label smoothing.py
preprocessor.py
spatial smoothing.py
thermometer encoding.py
variance minimization.py
detection/
detector.py
poison detection/
activation defence.py
clustering analyzer.py
ground truth evaluator.py
poison filtering defence.py
data generators.py
metrics.py
utils.py
visualization.py
The following sections each address one module of the library. The description of each library
module is organized as follows: we first introduce the general concept, mathematical notation
and a formal definition. We then provide a functional description of the library module. Finally,
we give examples of how to use the respective functionality.
4 Classifiers
art.classifiers
This module contains the functional API allowing for the integration of classification models
into the library. The API is framework-independent, and multiple machine learning backends
are currently supported. The modularity of the library also allows for new frameworks to be
incorporated with minimal effort. The following framework-specific classifier implementations
are supported in the current version of ART:
• art.classifiers.KerasClassifier: support for the Keras [13] backend (see Section 4.2)
• art.classifiers.MXClassifier: support for MXNet [12] (detailed in Section 4.3)
• art.classifiers.PyTorchClassifier: support for PyTorch [37] (Section 4.4)
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• art.classifiers.TFClassifier: implementation for TensorFlow [1] (see Section 4.5).
Additionally, the class art.classifiers.EnsembleClassifier provides support for aggre-
gating multiple classifiers into an ensemble (detailed in Section 4.6). All these are extensions of
the Classifier base class, described in the following.
4.1 The Classifier Base Class
art.classifiers.Classifier art/classifiers/classifier.py
The Classifier abstract class provides access to the components and properties of a classifier
that are required for adversarial attacks and defences. It abstracts from the actual framework in
which the classifier is implemented (e.g. TensorFlow, PyTorch, etc.), and hence makes the mod-
ules for adversarial attacks and defences framework-independent. This allows for easy extension
when adding support for a new framework in ART: one only has to extend the base Classifier
without need of reimplementing the other modules making use of it.
The public interface of the Classifier grants access to the following properties:
• channel index: the index of the axis containing the colour channel in the data.
• clip values: the range of the data as a tuple (xmin, xmax).
• input shape: the shape of one input sample.
• layer names: a list with the names of the layers in the model, ordered from input towards
output. Note: this list does not include the input and output layers, only the hidden ones.
The correctness of this property is not guaranteed and depends on the extent where this
information can be extracted from the underlying model.
• nb classes: the number of output classes K.
Additionally, each class extending Classifier has to provide the following functions:
• init (clip values, channel index, defences=None, preprocessing=(0, 1))
Initializes the classifier with the given clip values (xmin, xmax) and defences. The preprocess-
ing tuple of the form (substractor, divider) indicate two float values to be substracted,
respectively used to divide the inputs as preprocessing operations. These will always be
applied by the classifier before performing any operation on data. The default values (0,
1) correspond to no preprocessing being applied. The defences parameter is either a string
or a list of strings selecting the defences to be applied from the following:
– featsqueeze[1-8]? for feature squeezing, where the digit at the end indicates the bit
depth (see Section 6.3)
– labsmooth for label smoothing (see Section 6.4)
– smooth for spatial smoothing (see Section 6.5).
• predict(x, logits=False) -> np.ndarray
Returns predictions of the classifier for the given inputs. If logits is False, then the class
probabilities F(·) are returned, otherwise the class logits Z(·) (predictions before softmax).
The shape of the returned array is (n, K) where n is the number of given samples and K the
number of classes.
• class gradient(x, label=None, logits=False) -> np.ndarray
Returns the gradients of the class probabilities or logits (depending on the value of the
logits parameter), evaluated at the given inputs. Specifying a class label (one-hot en-
coded) will only compute the class gradients for the respective class. Otherwise, gradients
for all classes will be computed. The shape of the returned array is of the form (n, K, I) when
no label is specified, or (n, 1, I) for a given label, where I is the shape of the classifier inputs.
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• loss gradient(x, y) -> np.ndarray
Returns the loss gradient evaluated at the given inputs x and y. The labels are assumed to
be one-hot encoded, i.e. the label y is encoded as the yth standard basis vector ey. The shape
of the returned array is of the form (n, I) under the above notation.
• fit(x, y, batch size=128, nb epochs=20) -> None
Fits the classifier to the given data, using the provided batch size and number of epochs.
The labels are assumed to be one-hot encoded.
• get activations(x, layer) -> np.ndarray
Computes and returns the values of the activations (outputs) of the specified layer index for
the given data x. The layer index goes from 0 to the total number of internal layers minus
one. The input and output layers are not considered in the total number of available layers.
4.2 Keras Implementation
art.classifiers.KerasClassifier art/classifiers/keras.py
This class provides support for Keras models. It differs from the base Classifier only in the
signature of the constructor:
• init (clip values, model, use logits=False, channel index=3, defences=None,
preprocessing=(0, 1), input layer=0, output layer=0):
– clip values, channel index, defences and preprocessing correspond to the param-
eters of the base class. channel index should be set to 3 when using the TensorFlow
backend for Keras, and 1 when using Theano.
– model is the compiled Keras Model object.
– use logits should be set to True when the output of the model parameter are the
logits; otherwise, probabilities as output are assumed.
– input layer and output layer are two integers that allow the integration of Keras
models with multiple input and outputs layers into the library. They specify the indices
of the layers to be considered respectively as input and output of the classifier when
computing gradients. In the case of models with only one input and output, these
values do not need to be specified.
4.3 MXNet Implementation
art.classifiers.MXClassifier art/classifiers/mxnet.py
This is the class supporting the integration of MXNet Gluon models. The constructor is as
follows:
• init (clip values, model, input shape, nb classes, optimizer=None,
ctx=None, channel index=1, defences=None, preprocessing=(0, 1)), where:
– clip values, channel index, defences and preprocessing correspond to the param-
eters of the base class.
– model is the mxnet.gluon.Block object containing the model.
– input shape is the shape of one input.
– nb classes is the number of classes in the model.
– optimizer is the mxnet.gluon.Trainer used to train the classifier. This parameter is
only required if fitting will be done through the Classifier interface.
– ctx is the device on which the model runs (CPU or GPU).
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4.4 PyTorch Implementation
art.classifiers.PyTorchClassifier art/classifiers/pytorch.py
This class allows for the integration of PyTorch models. The signature of the constructor is as
follows:
• init (clip values, model, loss, optimizer, input shape, nb classes,
channel index=1, defences=None, preprocessing=(0, 1)), where:
– clip values, channel index, defences and preprocessing correspond to the param-
eters of the base class.
– model is the torch.nn.module object containing the model.
– loss is the loss function for training.
– optimizer is the optimizer used to train the classifier.
– input shape is the shape of one input.
– nb classes is the number of classes of the classifier.
4.5 TensorFlow Implementation
art.classifiers.TFClassifier art/classifiers/tensorflow.py
The TFClassifier provides a wrapper around TensorFlow models allowing to integrate them
under the Classifier API. Its init function takes the following parameters:
• init (clip values, input ph, logits, output ph=None, train=None,
loss=None, learning=None, sess=None, channel index=3, defences=None,
preprocessing=(0, 1)), where:
– clip values, channel index, defences and preprocessing correspond to the param-
eters of the base class.
– input ph: The input placeholder of the model.
– logits: The logits layer.
– output ph: The label placeholder.
– train: The symbolic training objective.
– loss: The symbolic loss function.
– learning: The placeholder to indicate if the model is training.
– sess: The TensorFlow session.
Note that many of these parameters are only required when training a TensorFlow classi-
fier through ART. When using a ready-trained model, only clip values, input ph, output ph,
logits and sess are required.
4.6 Ensembles of Classifiers
art.classifiers.EnsembleClassifier art/classifiers/ensemble.py
This class aggregates multiple objects of type Classifier as an ensemble. Its purpose is to
allow for attacks to be applied to ensembles, as has been investigated in some research papers [].
The individual classifiers are expected to be trained when the ensemble is created, and no train-
ing procedure is provided through this class. The functions described in the following are sup-
ported for an ensemble of classifiers. All other functions from the Classifier API will raise a
NotImplementedException when called with an EnsembleClassifier instance.
• init (clip values, classifiers, classifier weights=None, channel index=3,
defences=None, preprocessing=(0, 1)), where:
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– clip values, channel index, defences and preprocessing correspond to the param-
eters of the base class.
– classifiers is the list of Classifier instances to be aggregated together.
– classifier weights is a list of weights to assign to their prediction when aggregating
results, one value per classifier. If no value is provided, equal weights are assumed.
• predict(x, logits=False, raw=False) -> np.ndarray
• class gradient(x, label=None, logits=False, raw=False) -> np.ndarray
• loss gradient(x, y, raw=False) -> np.ndarray.
The previous functions behave following the Classifier API. When set to true, the additional
raw parameter allows to extract the predictions or gradients from all classifiers in the ensemble
without aggregating them. Otherwise, gradient aggregation is done by summing over the clas-
sifiers, while predictions are averaged at the probabilities layer (and converted back to logits if
required).
5 Attacks
art.attacks
This module contains all the attack methods supported by the library. These require access to
a Classifier object, which is the target of the attack. By using the framework-independent API
to access the targeted model, the attack implementation becomes agnostic to the framework used
for training the model. It is thus easy to implement new attacks in the library.
The following attacks are currently implemented in ART:
• art.attacks.FastGradientMethod: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17], presented in
Section 5.2
• art.attacks.BasicIterativeMethod: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [24], detailed in Sec-
tion 5.3
• art.attcks.ProjectedGradientDescent: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [27], detailed
in Section 5.4
• art.attacks.SaliencyMapMethod: Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [35], see Sec-
tion 5.5
• art.attacks.CarliniL2Method: Carlini & Wagner attack [9], see Section 5.6
• art.attacks.DeepFool: DeepFool [31], see Section 5.8
• art.attacks.UniversalPerturbation: Universal Perturbation [32], see Section 5.9
• art.attacks.NewtonFool: NewtonFool [22], see Section 5.10
• art.attacks.VirtualAdversarialMethod: Virtual Adversarial Method [30], detailed in
Section 5.11.
We now describe the base class behind all attack implementations.
5.1 The Attack Base Class
art.attacks.Attack art/attacks/attack.py
ART has an abstract class Attack in the art.attacks.attack module which implements a
common interface for any of the particular attacks implemented in the library. The class has an
attribute classifier, an instance of the Classifier class, which is the classifier C(x) that the
attack aims at. Moreover, the class has the following public methods:
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• init (classifier)
Initializes the attack with the given classifier.
• generate(x, ∗∗kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Applies the attack to the given input x, using any attack-specific parameters provided in the
∗∗kwargs dictionary. The parameters provided in the dictionary are also set in the attack
attributes. Returns the perturbed inputs in an np.ndarray which has the same shape as x.
• set params(∗∗kwargs) -> bool
Initializes attack-specific hyper-parameters provided in the ∗∗kwargs dictionary; returns
“True” if the hyper-parameters were valid and the initialization successful, “False” other-
wise.
5.2 FGSM
art.attacks.FastGradientMethod art/attacks/fast gradient.py
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17] works both in targeted and untargeted settings,
and aims at controlling either the `1, `2 or `∞ norm of the adversarial perturbation. In the targeted
case and for the `∞ norm, the adversarial perturbation generated by the FGSM attack is given by
ψ(x, y) = −e · sign(∇xL(x, y))
where e > 0 is the attack strength and y is the target class specified by the attacker. The adversar-
ial sample is given by
xadv = clip(x+ ψ(x, y), xmin, xmax).
Intuitively, the attack transforms the input x to reduce the classifier’s loss when classifying it
as y. For the `p norms with p = 1, 2, the adversarial perturbation is calculated as
ψ(x, y) = e · ∇xL(x, y)‖∇xL(x, y)‖p .
Note that “Sign” in the attack name “FGSM” refers to the specific calculation for the `∞ norm
(for which the attack was originally introduced). Sometimes the modified attacks for the `1 and `2
norms are referred to as “Fast Gradient Methods” (FGM), nevertheless we will also refer to them
as FGSM for simplicity. The untargeted version of the FGSM attack is devised as
ρ(x) = −ψ(x, C(x)), (1)
i.e. the input x is transformed to increase the classifier’s loss when continuing to classify it as
C(x).
ART also implements an extension of the FGSM attack, in which the minimum perturbation
is determined for which C(xadv) 6= C(x). This modification takes as input two extra floating-
point parameters: estep and emax. It sequentially performs the standard FGSM attack with strength
e = k · estep for k = 1, 2, . . . until either the attack is successful (and the resulting adversarial sample
xadv is returned), or k · estep > emax, in which case the attack has failed.
The main advantage of FGSM is that it is very efficient to compute: only one gradient evalua-
tion is required, and the attack can be applied straight-forward to a batch of inputs. This makes
the FGSM (or variants thereof) a popular choice for adversarial training (see Section 6.1) in which
a large number of adversarial samples needs to be generated.
The strength of the FGSM attack depends on the choice of the parameter e. If e is too small,
then C(xadv) might not differ from C(x). On the other hand, the norm ‖x− xadv‖p grows linearly
with e. When choosing e, it is particularly important to consider the actual data range [xmin, xmax].
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Implementation details The FastGradientMethod class has the following attributes:
• norm: the norm p of the adversarial perturbation (must be either np.inf, 1 or 2).
• eps: the attack strength e (must be greater than 0).
• targeted: indicates whether the attack is targeted (True) or untargeted (False).
• random init: indicates if the attack should first perform a random step of norm eps prior
to computing the adversarial noise. The norm type used is the same as the one specified for
the attack.
• batch size: size of the batch to use when computing the attack.
The functions in the class take the following form:
• init (classifier, norm=np.inf, eps=0.3, targeted=False, random init=False,
batch size=128)
Initializes an FGSM attack instance.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Applies the attack to the given input x. The function accepts the same parameters as
‘ init ‘, but has two additional parameters:
– y: An np.ndarray containing labels for the inputs x in one-hot encoding. If the attack
is targeted, y is required and specifies the target classes. If the attack is untargeted,
y is optional and overwrites the C(x) argument in (1). Note that it is not advisable
to provide true labels in the untargeted case, as this may lead to the so-called label
leaking effect [24].
– minimal: True if the minimal perturbation should be computed. In that case, also
eps step for the step size and eps max for the maximum perturbation should be pro-
vided (default values are 0.1 and 1.0, respectively).
5.3 Basic Iterative Method
art.attacks.BasicIterativeMethod art/attacks/iterative method.py
The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [24] is a straightforward extension of FGSM that applies the
attack multiple times, iteratively. In its original version, this attack differs from FGSM in that it is
targeted towards the least likely class for a given sample, i.e. the class for which the model outputs
the lowest score. The library implementation uses the same options for targets as for FGM (least
likely class is not the default, but can be specified by the user). Like in the case of FGM, BIM is
limited by a total attack budget e, and it has an additional parameter estep determining the step
size at each iteration. At each step, the result of the attack is projected back onto the e-size ball
centered around the original input. The attack is originally designed for L∞ norm perturbations,
but can easily be extended to other norms.
Implementation details The BasicIterativeMethod class has the following specific parame-
ters:
• norm: the norm p of the adversarial perturbation (must be either np.inf, 1 or 2).
• eps: the attack strength e (must be greater than 0).
• eps step: the step size estep to be taken at each iteration.
• max iter: the maximum number of iterations to be performed.
• targeted: indicates whether the attack is targeted (True) or untargeted (False).
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• random init: indicates if the attack should first perform a random step of norm eps prior
to computing the adversarial noise. The norm type used is the same as the one specified for
the attack.
The functions in the class follow the Attack API. The previous parameters can be set either
in init or when calling the generate function. Additionally, attack targets y can be provided
when calling generate with the same behavior as for FGM.
5.4 Projected Gradient Descent
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [27] is also an iterative extension of FGSM and very similar to
BIM. The main difference with BIM resides in the fact that PGD projects the attack result back on
the e-norm ball around the original input at each iteration of the attack.
Implementation details PGD has the same parameters as BIM (see previous section).
5.5 JSMA
art.attacks.SaliencyMapMethod art/attacks/saliency map.py
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [35] is a targeted attack which aims at con-
trolling the `0 norm, i.e. the number of components of x that are being modified when crafting the
adversarial sample xadv. The attack iteratively modifies individual components of x until either
the targeted misclassification is achieved or the total number of modified components exceeds a
specified budget.
Details are outlined in Algorithm 1. To simplify notation, we let N denote the total number
of components of x and refer to individual components using subscripts: xi for i = 1, . . . , N. The
key step is the computation of the saliency map (line 4), which is outlined in Algorithm 2. Essen-
tially, the saliency map determines the components imax, jmax of x to be modified next based on how
much this would increase the probability Fy(x) of the target class y (captured in the sum of partial
derivatives α), and decrease the sum of probabilities over all other classes (captured in the sum of
partial derivatives β). In particular, line 4 in Algorithm 2 ensures that α is positive, β is negative
and |α · β| is maximal over all pairs in the search space. Considering pairs instead of individual
components is motivated by the observation that this increases the chances of satisfying the con-
ditions α > 0 and β < 0 ([35], page 9). In our implementation of the saliency map, we exploit that
β can be expressed as
β = −
(
∂Fy(x)
∂xi
+
∂Fy(x)
∂xj
)
(due to ∑k∈Y\{y} Fk(x) = 1− Fy(x)), and thus i, j are the two largest components of ∇Fy(x).
Line 9 in Algorithm 1 applies the perturbations to the components determined by the saliency
map. The set Ωsearch keeps track of all the components that still can be modified (i.e. the clipping
value xmax has not been exceeded), and Ωmodified of all the components that have been modified at
least once. The algorithm terminates if the attack has succeeded (i.e. C(x) = y), the number of
modified components has exhausted the budget (i.e. |Ωmodified| > bγ · Nc), less than 2 components
can still be modified (i.e. |Ωsearch| < 2), or the saliency map returns the saliency score smax = −∞
(indicating it hasn’t succeeded in determining components satisfying the conditions in line 4 of
Algorithm 2).
Two final comments on the JSMA method:
• Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the method for positive values of the input parameter θ, re-
sulting in perturbations where the components of x are increased while crafting xadv. In
principle, it is possible to also use negative values for θ. In fact, the experiments in [35]
(Section IV D) suggest that using a negative θ results in perturbations that are harder to de-
tect by the human eye¶. The implementation in ART supports both positive and negative θ,
however note that for negative θ the following changes apply:
¶Which however might be specific to the MNIST data set that was used in those experiments.
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Algorithm 1 JSMA method
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
y: Target label
θ: Amount of perturbation per step and feature (assumed to be positive; see discussion in
text)
γ: Maximum fraction of features to be perturbed (between 0 and 1)
1: Ωmodified ← ∅
2: Ωsearch ← {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : xi 6= xmax}
3: while C(x) 6= y and |Ωsearch| > 1 do
4: (smax, i, j)← saliency map(x, y,Ωsearch)
5: Ωmodified ← Ωmodified ∪ {i, j}
6: if smax = −∞ or |Ωmodified| > bγ · Nc then
7: break
8: end if
9: xi ← clip(xi + θ, xmin, xmax), xj ← clip(xj + θ, xmin, xmax)
10: Ωsearch ← Ωsearch \ {k ∈ {i, j} : xk = xmax}
11: end while
12: xadv ← x
Output:
Adversarial sample xadv.
– In Algorithm 1, line 2: change the condition xi 6= xmax to xi 6= xmin.
– In Algorithm 1, line 10: change the condition xk 6= xmax to xk 6= xmin.
– In Algorithm 2, line 4: change the conditions α > 0 and β < 0 to α < 0 and β > 0,
respectively.
• While Algorithm 2 outlines the computation of the saliency map based on the partial
derivates of the classifier probabilities F(x), one can, in principle, consider the partial
derivates of the classifier logits Z(x) instead. As discussed in [9], it appears that both vari-
ants have been implemented and used in practice. The current implementation in ART
uses the partial derivates of the classifier probabilities which, as explained above, can be
performed particularly efficiently.
Implementation details The SaliencyMapMethod class has the following attributes:
• theta: Amount of perturbation θ per step and component (can be positive or negative).
• gamma: Maximum fraction of components γ to be perturbed (must be > 0 and ≤ 1).
The functions in the class take the following form:
• init (classifier, theta=0.1, gamma=1)
Initializes a JSMA attack instance.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Applies the attack to the given input x. The function accepts the same parameters as
init , but has one additional parameter:
– y, which is an np.ndarray containing the target labels, one-hot encoded. If not pro-
vided, target labels will be sampled uniformly from Y \ {C(x)}.
5.6 Carlini & Wagner `2 attack
art.attacks.CarliniL2Method art/attacks/carlini.py
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Algorithm 2 JSMA saliency map
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
y: Target label
Ωsearch: Set of indices of x to be explored.
1: smax ← −∞, imax ← None, jmax ← None
2: for each subset {i, j} ⊂ Ωsearch with i < j do
3: Compute
α =
∂Fy(x)
∂xi
+
∂Fy(x)
∂xj
, β = ∑
k∈Y\{y}
(
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
+
∂Fk(x)
∂xj
)
.
4: if α > 0 and β < 0 and |α · β| > smax then
5: smax ← |α · β|, imax ← i, jmax ← j
6: end if
7: end for
Output:
Maximum saliency score and selected components (smax, imax, jmax).
The Carlini & Wagner (C&W) `2 attack [9] is a targeted attack which aims to minimize the `2
norm of adversarial perturbations. Below we will discuss how to perform untargeted attacks. For
a fixed input x, a target label y and a confidence parameter κ ≥ 0, consider the objective function
L(c, x′) := ‖x′ − x‖22 + c · `(x′) (2)
where
`(x′) = max
(
max
{
Zi(x′) : i ∈ Y \ {y}
}− Zy(x′) + κ, 0). (3)
Note that `(x′) = 0 if and only if C(x′) = y and the logit Zy(x′) exceeds any other logit Zi(x′) by
at least κ, thus relating to the classifier’s confidence in the output C(x′). The C&W attack aims
at finding the smallest c for which the x′ minimizing L(x′, c) is such that `(x′) = 0. This can
be regarded as the optimal trade-off between achieving the adversarial target while keeping the
adversarial perturbation ‖x′− x‖22 as small as possible. In the ART implementation, binary search
is used for finding such c.
Details are outlined in Algorithm 3. Note that, in lines 1-2, the components of x are mapped
from [xmin, xmax] onto R, which is the space in which the adversarial sample is created. Working in
R avoids the need for clipping x during the process. The output xadv is transformed back to the
[xmin, xmax] range in lines 15-16. Algorithm 3 relies on two helper functions:
• minimize objective (line 7): this function aims at minimizing the objective function (2) for
the given value of c. In the ART implementation, the minimization is performed using gra-
dient descent with binary line search.* The maximum number of halvings and doublings of
the search step is specified via the parameters max halving and max doubling, respectively.
The search is aborted if the number of iterations exceeds the value given by the max iter
parameter. During the minimization, among all samples x′ for which `(x′) = 0, the one
with the smallest norm ‖x′ − x‖22 is retained and returned at the end of the minimization.
• update (line 12): this function updates the parameters clower, c, cdouble used in the binary search.
Specifically, if an adversarial sample with `(xnew) = 0 was found for the previous value of c,
then clower remains unchanged, c is set to (c + clower)/2 and cdouble is set to False. If `(xnew) 6= 0,
then clower is set to c, and c is either set to 2 · c (if cdouble is True) or to c + (c− clower)/2 (if cdouble
is False).† The binary search is abandoned if c exceeds the upper bound cupper (line 6).
*The original implementation in [9] used the Adam optimizer for the minimization problem and implemented an
optional early stopping criterion.
†This is a slight simplification of the original implementation in [9].
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The untargeted version of the C&W attack aims at changing the original classification, i.e. con-
structing an adversarial sample xadv with the only constraint that C(xadv) 6= C(x). The only differ-
ence in the algorithm is that the objective function (3) is modified as follows:
`(x′) = max
(
Zy(x′)−max
{
Zi(x′) : i ∈ Y \ {y}
}
+ κ, 0
)
(4)
where y is the original label of x (or the prediction C(x) thereof). Thus, `(x′) = 0 if and only if
there exists a label i ∈ Y \ {y} such that the logit Zi(x) exceeds the logit Zy(x) by at least κ.
Algorithm 3 Carlini & Wagner’s `2 attack (targeted)
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
y: Target label
γ: constant to avoid over-/underflow in (arc)tanh computations
cinit: initialization of the binary search constant
cupper: upper bound for the binary search constant
bsteps: number of binary search steps to be performed
1: x← (x− xmin)/(xmax − xmin)
2: x← arctanh(((2 · x)− 1) · γ)
3: xadv ← x
4: clower ← 0, c← cinit, cdouble ← True
5: lmin ← ∞
6: while bsteps > 0 and c < cupper do
7: xnew ← minimize objective(c)
8: if `(xnew) = 0 and ‖xnew − x‖22 < lmin then
9: lmin ← ‖xnew − x‖22
10: xadv ← xnew
11: end if
12: (clower, c, cdouble)← update(c, cdouble, `(xnew))
13: bsteps ← bsteps − 1
14: end while
15: xadv ← (tanh(xadv)/γ+ 1)/2
16: xadv ← xadv · (xmax − xmin) + xmin
Output:
Adversarial sample xadv.
Implementation details The C&W attack is implemented in the CarliniL2Method class, with
the following attributes:
• confidence: κ value to be used in Objective (3).
• targeted: Specifies whether the attack should be targeted (True) or not (False).
• learning rate: The initial step size to be used for binary line search in minimize objective
(line 7).
• max iter: Maximum number of iterations to be used for binary line search in
minimize objective.
• max halving: Maximum number of step size halvings per iteration in minimize objective.
• max halving: Maximum number of step size doublings per iteration in
minimize objective.
• binary search steps: Number bsteps of binary search steps.
• initial const: Initial value cinit of the binary search variable c.
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• batch size: Size of batches on which the attack is to be performed.
The signatures of the functions are:
• init (classifier, confidence=0.0, targeted=True, learning rate=0.01,
binary search steps=10, max iter=10, initial const=0.01, max halving=5,
max doubling=5, batch size=128)
Initialize a C&W `2 attack with the given parameters.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Applies the attack to the given input x. The function accepts the same parameters as
init , and an additional parameter:
– y, which is an np.ndarray containing labels (one-hot encoded). In the case of a targeted
attack, y is required and specifies the target labels. In the case of an untargeted attack,
y is optional (if not provided, C(x) will be used); as commented earlier for the FGSM
attack, it is advised not to provide the true labels for untargeted attacks in order to
avoid label leaking.
If binary search steps is large, then the algorithm is not very sensitive to the value of
initial const. Note that the values γ = 0.999999 and cupper = 10e10 in Algorithm 3 are
hardcoded with the same values used by the authors of the method.
5.7 Carlini & Wagner `∞ attack
art.attacks.CarliniLInfMethod art/attacks/carlini.py
The Carlini & Wagner (C&W) LInf attack aims at finding an adversarial sample x′ satisfying
the objective `(x′) = 0 (with ` same as for the `2 attack, confer (3)) while obeying the constraint
‖x − x′‖∞ ≤ e for a given e > 0. The trick for solving this problem is to define an invertible
transformation
x 7→ t(x)
which element-wise maps the components of x from [xmin, xmax] onto R and ensures that for arbi-
trary z in the domain of t−1
‖x− t−1(z)‖∞ ≤ e.
This is accomplished by defining
t(x) := arctanh(((2 · x˜)− 1) · γ)
where the constant γ = 0.999999 prevents numerical overflow and
x˜ =
x−max(x− e, xmin)
min(x+ e, xmax)−max(x− e, xmin) .
The C&W LInf attack then simply solves the unconstrained optimization problem
xadv = t−1
(
arg min
z
`(t−1(z))
)
.
Note: this version of the LInf attack differs from the one introduced in [9] which is computa-
tionally more involved and doesn’t ensure that ‖x− xadv‖∞ ≤ e . For solving the minimization
problem, the same binary line search approach as in the L2 attack is used. The definition of an
untargeted attack is analogous to the L2 case.
17
Implementation details The C&W LInf attack is implemented in the CarliniLInfMethod class,
with the following attributes:
• confidence: κ value to be used in Objective (3).
• targeted: Specifies whether the attack should be targeted (True) or not (False).
• learning rate: The initial step size to be used for binary line search in minimize objective
(line 7).
• max iter: Maximum number of iterations to be used for binary line search in
minimize objective.
• max halving: Maximum number of step size halvings per iteration in minimize objective.
• max halving: Maximum number of step size doublings per iteration in
minimize objective.
• eps: The e value in the `∞ norm constraint.
• batch size: Size of batches on which the attack is to be performed.
The signatures of the functions are:
• init (classifier, confidence=0.0, targeted=True, learning rate=0.01,
binary search steps=10, max iter=10, max halving=5, max doubling=5, eps=0.3,
batch size=128)
Initialize a C&W LInf attack with the given parameters.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Applies the attack to the given input x. The function accepts the same parameters as
init , and an additional parameter:
– y, which is an np.ndarray containing labels (one-hot encoded). In the case of a targeted
attack, y is required and specifies the target labels. In the case of an untargeted attack,
y is optional (if not provided, C(x) will be used); as commented earlier for the FGSM
attack, it is advised not to provide the true labels for untargeted attacks in order to
avoid label leaking.
5.8 DeepFool
art.attacks.DeepFool art/attacks/deepfool.py
DeepFool [31] is an untargeted attack which aims, for a given input x, to find the nearest
decision boundary in `2 norm‡. Implementation details are provided in Algorithm 4. The basic
idea is to project the input onto the nearest decision boundary; since the decision boundaries are
non-linear, this is done iteratively. DeepFool often results in adversarial samples that lie exactly
on a decision boundary; in order to push the samples over the boundaries and thus change their
classification, the final adversarial perturbation xadv − x is multiplied by a factor 1+ e (see line 8).
Implementation details The DeepFool class has three attributes:
• max iter: maximum number of projection steps imax to be undertaken.
• epsilon: overshoot parameter (must be ≥ 0).
• batch size: size of the batch to use when computing the attack.
The class functions implement the Attack API in the following:
‡While [31] also explains how to adapt the algorithm to minimize the `1 or `∞ norms of adversarial perturbations by
modifying the expressions in (5)-(6), this is currently not implemented in ART.
18
Algorithm 4 DeepFool attack
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
imax: Maximum number of projection steps
e: Overshoot parameter (must be ≥ 0)
1: xadv ← x
2: i← 0
3: while i < imax and C(x) = C(xadv) do
4: Compute
l ← arg min
k∈Y\{C(x)}
∣∣Zk(xadv)− ZC(x)(xadv)∣∣∥∥∇Zk(xadv)−∇ZC(x)(xadv)∥∥2 , (5)
xadv ← xadv +
∣∣Zl(xadv)− ZC(x)(xadv)∣∣∥∥∇Zl(xadv)−∇ZC(x)(xadv)∥∥22 ·
(∇Zl(xadv)−∇ZC(x)(xadv)). (6)
5: xadv ← clip(xadv, xmin, xmax)
6: i← i + 1
7: end while
8: xadv ← clip(x+ (1+ e) · (xadv − x), xmin, xmax)
Output:
Adversarial sample xadv.
• init (classifier, max iter=100, epsilon=1e-6, batch size=128)
Initialize a DeepFool attack with the given parameters.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Apply the attack to x. The same parameters as for init can be specified at this point.
5.9 Universal Adversarial Perturbations
art.attacks.UniversalPerturbation art/attacks/universal perturbation.py
Universal adversarial perturbations [32] are a special type of untargeted attacks, aiming to
create a constant perturbation ρ that successfuly alters the classification of a specified fraction of
inputs. The universal perturbation is crafted using a given untargeted attack ρ(·). Essentially, as
long as the target fooling rate has not been achieved or the maximum number of iterations has not
been reached, the algorithm iteratively adjusts the universal perturbation by adding refinements
which help to perturb additional samples from the input set; after each iteration, the universal
perturbation is projected into the `p ball with radius e in order to control the attack strength.
Details are provided in Algorithm 5.
Implementation details The UniversalPerturbation class has the following attributes:
• attacker: A string representing which attack ρ should be used in Algorithm 5. The follow-
ing attacks are supported: carlini (Carlini & Wagner attack), deepfool (DeepFool), fgsm
(Fast Gradient Sign Method), jsma (JSMA), newtonfool (NewtonFool) and vat (Virtual Ad-
versarial Method).
• attacker params: A dictionary with attack-specific parameters that will be passed onto the
selected attacker. If this parameter is not specified, the default values for the chosen attack
are used.
• delta: Attack failure tolerance δ (must lie in [0, 1]).
• max iter: Maximum number of iterations imax.
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Algorithm 5 Universal Adversarial Perturbation
Input:
X: Set of inputs to be used for constructing the universal adversarial perturbation
ρ(·): Adversarial attack to be used
δ: Attack failure tolerance (1− δ is the target fooling rate)
e: Attack step size
p: Norm of the adversarial perturbation
imax: Maximum number of iterations
1: ρ← 0
2: rfool ← 0
3: i← 0
4: while rfool < 1− δ and i < imax do
5: for x ∈ X in random order do
6: if C(x+ ρ) = C(x) then
7: xadv ← x+ ρ(x+ ρ)
8: if C(xadv) 6= C(x) then
9: ρ← project(xadv − x+ ρ, p, e)
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: rfool ← 1|X| ∑x∈X I(C(x) 6= C(x+ ρ))
14: i← i + 1
15: end while
Output:
Adversarial samples xadv = x+ ρ for x ∈ X.
• eps: Attack step size e.
• norm: Norm p of the adversarial perturbation (must be either np.inf, 1 or 2).
The class functions implement the Attack API as follows:
• init (classifier, attacker=’deepfool’, attacker params=None, delta=0.2,
max iter=20, eps=10.0, norm=np.inf)
Initialize a Universal Perturbation attack with the given parameters.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Apply the attack to x. The same parameters as for init can be specified at this point.
5.10 NewtonFool
art.attacks.NewtonFool art/attacks/newtonfool.py
NewtonFool [22] is an untargeted attack that tries to decrease the probability Fy(x) of the orig-
inal class y = C(x) by performing gradient descent. The step size δ is determined adaptively in
Equation (7): when Fy(xadv) is larger than 1/K (recall K is the number of classes in Y), which is the
case as long as C(xadv) = y, then the second term will dominate; once Fy(xadv) approaches or falls
below 1/K, the first term will dominate. The tuning parameter η determines how aggressively
the gradient descent attempts to minimize the probability of class y. The method is described in
detail in Algorithm 6.
Implementation details The NewtonFool class has the following attributes:
• max iter: maximum number of iterations imax.
• eta: strength of adversarial perturbations η.
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Algorithm 6 NewtonFool attack
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
η: Strength of adversarial perturbations
imax: Maximum number of iterations
1: y← C(x), xadv ← x, i← 0
2: while i < imax do
3: Compute
δ ← min {η · ‖x‖2 · ‖∇Fy(xadv)‖, Fy(xadv)− 1/K}, (7)
d ← − δ · ∇Fy(xadv)‖∇Fy(xadv)‖22
4: xadv ← clip(xadv + d, xmin, xmax)
5: i← i + 1
6: end while
Output:
Adversarial sample xadv.
• batch size: size of the batch to use when computing the attack.
The class functions implement the Attack API as follows:
• init (classifier, max iter=1000, eta=0.01, batch size=128)
Initialize NewtonFool with the given parameters.
• generate(x, **kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Apply the attack to x. The same parameters as for init can be specified at this point.
5.11 Virtual Adversarial Method
art.attacks.VirtualAdversarialMethod art/attacks/virtual adversarial.py
The Virtual Adversarial Method [29] is not intended to create adversarial samples resulting
in misclassification, but rather samples that, if included in the training set for adversarial train-
ing, result in local distributional smoothness of the trained model. We use N to denote the total
number of components of classifier inputs and assume, for sake of convenience, that X = RN .
By N(0, IN) we denote a random sample of the N-dimensional standard normal distribution,
and by ei the ith standard basis vector of dimension N. The key idea behind the algorithm is to
construct a perturbation d with `2 unit norm maximizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
KL[F(x)‖F(x + d)]. In Algorithm 7 this is done iteratively via gradient ascent along finite dif-
ferences (line 9). The final adversarial example xadv is constructed by adding e · d to the original
input x (line 14), where e is the perturbation strength parameter provided by the user.
Implementation details The VirtualAdversarialMethod class has the following attributes:
• eps: Strength of adversarial perturbations e.
• finite diff: Finite differences width ξ.
• max iter: Maximum number of iterations imax.
The following functions are accessible to users:
• init (classifier, max iter=1, finite diff=1e-6, eps=0.1)
Initialize an instance of the virtual vdversarial perturbation generator for Virtual Adversar-
ial Training.
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Algorithm 7 Virtual Adversarial Method with finite differences
Input:
x: Input to be adversarially perturbed
e: Perturbation strength
ξ: Finite differences width
imax: Maximum number of iterations
1: d← N(0, IN)
2: d← d/‖d‖2
3: i← 0
4: while i < imax do
5: κ1 ← KL[F(x)‖F(x+ d)]
6: dnew ← d
7: for i = 1, 2, . . . , N do
8: κ2 ← KL[F(x)‖F(x+ d+ ξ · ei)]
9: dnew ← dnew + (κ2 − κ1)/ξ · ei
10: end for
11: d← dnew
12: d← d/‖d‖2
13: end while
14: xadv ← clip(x+ e · d, xmin, xmax)
Output:
Adversarial sample xadv.
• generate(x, ∗∗kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Compute the perturbation on x. The ∗∗kwargs dictionary allows the user to overwrite any of
the attack parameters, which will be set in the class attributes. Returns an array containing
the adversarially perturbed sample(s).
6 Defences
art.defences
There is a plethora of methods for defending against evasion attacks which can roughly be
categorized as follows:
Model hardening refers to techniques resulting in a new classifier with better robustness prop-
erties than the original one with respect to some given metrics.
Data preprocessing techniques achieve higher robustness by using transformations of the classi-
fier inputs and labels, respectively, at test and/or training time.
Runtime detection of adversarial samples by extending the original classifier with a detector in
order to check whether a given input is adversarial or not.
The following defences are currently implemented in ART:
• art.defences.AdversarialTrainer: adversarial training, a method for model hardening
(see Section 6.1).
• art.defences.FeatureSqueezing: feature squeezing, a defence based on input data pre-
processing (see Section 6.3).
• art.defences.LabelSmoothing: label smoothing, a defence based on processing the labels
before model training (described in Section 6.4).
• art.defences.SpatialSmoothing: spatial smoothing, a defence based on input data pre-
processing (see Section 6.5).
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• art.defences.JpegCompression: JPEG compression of data, also to be used as preprocess-
ing (covered in Section 6.6).
• art.defences.ThermometerEncoding: thermometer encoding, a defence based on chang-
ing the encoding of the data to unary basis before training and prediction (see Section 6.7).
• art.defences.TotalVarMin total variance minimization, a compressed sensing approach
that combines pixel dropout with total varia- tion minimization to preprocess test data (ex-
plained in Section 6.8).
• art.defences.GaussianAugmentation: data augmentation based on Gaussian noise,
meant to reinforce the structure of the model (described in Section 6.9).
6.1 Adversarial Training
art.defences.AdversarialTrainer art/defences/adversarial trainer.py
The idea of adversarial training [17] is to improve the robustness of the classifier C(x) by
including adversarial samples in the training set. A special case of adversarial training is virtual
adversarial training [30] where the adversarial samples are generated by the Virtual Adversarial
Method (see Section 5.11).
The ART implementation of adversarial training incorporates the original protocol, as well as
ensemble adversarial training [40], training fully on adversarial data and other common setups. If
multiple attacks are specified, they are rotated for each batch. If the specified attacks have as target
a different model that the one being trained, then the attack is transferred. A ratio parameter
determines how many of the clean samples in each batch are replaced with their adversarial
counterpart.
Implementation details The AdversarialTrainer class has the following public functions:
• init (classifier, attacks, ratio=.5),
The parameters of the constructor are the following:
– classifier: The classifier C(x) to be hardened by adversarial training.
– attacks: Attack or list of attacks to be used for adversarial training. These are instances
of the Attack class.
– ratio: The proportion of samples in each batch to be replaced with their adversarial
counterparts. Setting this value to 1 allows to train only on adversarial samples.
Each instance of the class Attack (corresponding to ρi(x) in the notation above), has an
attribute classifier with the classifier the attack aims at, corresponding to Ci(x) in the
notation above.
• fit(x, y, batch size=128, nb epochs=20) -> None
Method for training the hardened classifier. x and y are the original training inputs and
labels, respectively. The method applies the adversarial attacks specified in the attacks
parameter of init to obtain the enhanced training set as explained above. Then the
fit function of the classifier specified in the class attribute classifier is called with the
enhanced training set as input. The hardened classifier is trained with the given batch size
for as many epochs as specified. After calling this function, the classifier attribute of the
class contains the hardened classifier C(x).
• fit generator(generator, nb epochs=20)
Train a model adversarially using a data generator for the number of epochs that was spec-
ified. Adversarial training is performed using the configuration specified in the init
function. Here, generator is an instance following the DataGenerator interface (see Sec-
tion 10 for details), which creates a wrapper on top of custom or framework-specific data
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feeders. Like in the case of fit, after calling this function, the classifier attribute of the
class contains the hardened classifier C(x).
• predict(x, ∗∗kwargs) -> np.ndarray
Calls the predict function of the hardened classifier C(x), passing on the dictionary of
arguments ∗∗kwargs).
6.2 The Data Preprocessor Base class
art.defences.Preprocessor art/defences/preprocessor.py
The abstract class Preprocessor provides a unified interface for all data preprocessing trans-
formations to be used as defences. The class has the following public methods:
• fit(x, y=None, ∗∗kwargs): Fit the transformations with the given data and parameters
(where applicable).
• call (x, y=None): Applies the transformations to the provided labels and/or inputs
and returns the transformed data.
• is fitted: Check whether the transformations have been fitted (where applicable).
Feature squeezing, label smoothing, spatial smoothing and Gaussian data augmentation are all
data preprocessing techniques. Their implementation is based on the Preprocessor abstract class.
We describe them individually in the following sections.
6.3 Feature Squeezing
art.defences.FeatureSqueezing art/defences/feature squeezing.py
Feature squeezing [43] reduces the precision of the components of x by encoding them on a
smaller number of bits. In the case of images, one can think of feature squeezing as reducing
the common 8-bit pixel values to b bits where b < 8. Formally, assuming that the components
of x all lie within [0, 1] (which would have been obtained, e.g., by dividing 8-bit pixel values by
255) and given the desired bit depth b, feature squeezing applies the following transformation
component-wise:
x ← bx · (2b − 1)c/(2b − 1). (8)
Future implementations of this method will support arbitrary data ranges of the components of
x.
Implementation details The FeatureSqueezing class is an extension of the Preprocessor base
class. Since feature squeezing does not require any model fitting for the data transformations,
is fitted always returns True, and the fit function does not have any effect. We now describe
the functions and parameters specific to this class:
• init (bit depth=8)
– bit depth: The bit depth b on which to encode features.
• call (x, y=None, bit depth=None, clip values=(0, 1)) -> np.ndarray
As feature squeezing only works on the inputs x, providing labels y to this function does
not have any effect. The bit depth parameter has the same meaning as in the construc-
tor. clip values is a tuple of two values bounding the data range in the form (xmin, xmax).
Calling this method returns the squeezed inputs x.
Note that any instance of the Classifier class which has feature squeezing as one of their
defences will automatically apply this operation when the fit or predict functions are called.
The next example shows how to activate this defence when creating a classifier object from a
Keras model:
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In [1]: from keras.models import load_model
model = load_model('keras_model.h5')
classifier = KerasClassifier((0, 1), model, defences='featsqueeze5')
Applying feature squeezing to data without using a classifier would be done as follows:
In [1]: import numpy as np
from art.defences import FeatureSqueezing
x = np.random.rand(50, 20)
feat_squeeze = FeatureSqueezing()
x = feat_squeeze(x, bit_depth=1)
6.4 Label Smoothing
art.defences.LabelSmoothing art/defences/label smoothing.py
Label smoothing [41] modifies the labels y during model training: instead of using one-hot
encoding, where y is represented by the standard basis vector y = ey, the following representation
is used:
yi ←
{
ymax if i = y
(1− ymax)/(K− 1) otherwise,
where ymax ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter specified by the user. The label representation y is thus
“smoothed” in the sense that the difference between its maximum and minimum components
is reduced and its entropy increased. The motivation behind this approach is that it might help
reducing gradients that an adversary could exploit in the construction of adversarial samples.
Implementation details Same as feature squeezing, label smoothing does not require any model
fitting, hence is fitted is always True, and the fit function is a dummy. Its LabelSmoothing
class specific functions are:
• init (max value=.9), with:
– max value representing ymax in the notation above.
• call (x, y, max value=0.9) -> (np.ndarray, np.ndarray)
This function expects one-hot encoded labels in y and returns the unmodified inputs x along
with the smoothed labels. max value can be specified directly when calling the method
instead of the constructor.
Note that any instance of the Classifier class which has label smoothing activated in the
defences will automatically apply it when the fit function is called. One can initiaze this defence
when creating a classifier as follows:
In [1]: from keras.models import load_model
model = load_model('keras_model.h5')
classifier = KerasClassifier((0, 1), model, defences='label_smooth')
Label smoothing can be used directly to preprocess the dataset as follows:
In [1]: import numpy as np
from art.defences import LabelSmoothing
x = np.random.rand(50, 20)
label_smooth = LabelSmoothing()
x = label_smooth(x, max_value=.8)
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6.5 Spatial Smoothing
art.defences.SpatialSmoothing art/defences/spatial smoothing.py
Spatial smoothing [43] is a defence specifically designed for images. It attempts to filter out
adversarial signals using local spatial smoothing. Let xijk denote the components of x. Recall that
i indexes width, j height and k the color channel. Given a window size w, the component xijk is
replaced by a median-filtered version:
xijk ← median
{
xi′ j′k : i− bw/2c ≤ i′ ≤ i + dw/2e − 1, j− bw/2c ≤ j′ ≤ j + dw/2e − 1
}
,
where features at the borders are reflected where needed:
• xijk = x(1−i),j,k for i = 0,−1, . . .
• x(k1+i),j,k = x(k1+1−i),j,k for i = 1, 2, . . .
and analogously for j. Note that the local spatial smoothing is applied separately in each color
channel k.
Implementation details Same as for the previous two defences, is fitted is always True, and
the fit function does not have any effect. The signatures of functions in the SpatialSmoothing
class are:
• init (window size=3, channel index=3), where:
– window size is the window size w.
– channel index is the index of the axis containing the color channel.
• call (self, x, y=None, window size=None, channel index=3) -> np.ndarray
This method only requires inputs x and returns them with spatial smoothing applied.
Note that any instance of the Classifier class which has spatial smoothing as one of their
defences will automatically apply it when the predict function is called. The next example shows
how to initialize a classifier with spatial smoothing.
In [1]: from keras.models import load_model
model = load_model('keras_model.h5')
classifier = KerasClassifier((0, 1), model, defences='smooth')
Spatial smoothing can be used directly to preprocess the dataset as follows:
In [1]: import numpy as np
from art.defences import SpatialSmoothing
x = np.random.rand(50, 20)
smooth = SpatialSmoothing()
x = smooth(x, window_size=5)
6.6 JPEG Compression
art.defences.JpegCompression art/defences/jpeg compression.py
JPEG compression [16, 14] can work as an effective preprocessing step in the classification
pipeline to counter adversarial attacks and dramatically reduce their effect. An important com-
ponent of JPEG compression is its ability to remove high frequency signal components, inside
square blocks of an image. Such an operation is equivalent to selective blurring of the image,
helping remove additive perturbations.
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Implementation details The JpegCompression class extends the Preprocessor abstract class.
Applying this method does not require training, thus the fit function is a dummy. The functions
supported by this class are:
• init (quality=50, channel index=3), where:
– quality: is a positive integer up to 95 controlling the compression rate: a higher value
means better quality of the image.
– channel index: is the index of the axis containing the colour channel in the data.
• call (x, y=None, quality=None, clip values=(0, 1)) -> np.ndarray
clip values is a tuple of two values bounding the data range in the form (xmin, xmax). The
labels y are not used in the computation. Calling this function returns the JPEG compressed
values of x.
6.7 Thermometer Encoding
art.defences.ThermometerEncoding art/defences/thermometer encoding.py
Thermometer encoding [8] is a preprocessing method for input discretization that encodes
each feature as a fixed-size binary vector. To this end, the input domain is first evenly divided
into b distinct buckets. b represents the number of bits that will be used for encoding each feature.
The encoded value per feature corresponds to a number of ones equal to the index of the bucket
containing the original value. The ones are filled from the back of the vector. As the representa-
tion is fixed-size, the rest of the vector is filled with zeros. Note that the thermometer encoding
preserves pairwise ordering information.
Implementation details The ThermometerEncoding class extends the Preprocessor abstract
class. Applying this method does not require training, thus the fit function is a dummy. The
functions supported by this class are:
• init (num space=10), where:
– num space is the number of levels that will be used for the encoding.
• call (x, y=None, num space=None, clip values=(0, 1)) -> np.ndarray
The labels y are not used in the computation. clip values is a tuple of two values bounding
the data range in the form (xmin, xmax). The function returns the encoded values of x.
6.8 Total Variance Minimization
art.defences.TotalVarMin art/defences/variance minimization.py
Total variance minimization [19] randomly selects a small set of pixels, and reconstructs the
simplest image that is consistent with the selected pixels. The reconstructed image does not con-
tain the adversarial perturbations because these perturbations tend to be small and localized.
Specifically, a small number of pixels is sampled using a Bernoulli random variable X(i, j, k)
for each pixel location (i, j, k). Next, total variation minimization is used to construct an image
z that is similar to the input image x for the selected set of pixels, whilst also being “simple” in
terms of total variation by solving:
min
z
||(1− X) (z− x)||2 + λ · TVp(z), (9)
where TVp(z) is the Lp total variation of z:
TVp(z) =
K
∑
k=1
[
N
∑
i=2
||z(i, :, k)− z(i− 1, :, k)||p +
N
∑
j=2
||z(:, j, k)− z(:, j− 1, k)||p
]
.
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The objective function in Equation (9) is convex in z. In the original method, the norm p is
set to L2, and the authors employ a special-purpose solver based on the split Bregman method to
perform total variance minimization efficiently.
Implementation details The TotalVarMin class extends the Preprocessor abstract class. Ap-
plying this method does not require training, thus the fit function is a dummy. The functions
supported by this class are:
• init (prob=0.3, norm=2, lam=0.5, solver=’L-BFGS-B’, maxiter=10), with param-
eters:
– prob: the probability of the Bernoulli distribution.
– norm: the p norm to be used when computing the TV term of the objective.
– lam: the regularization parameter λ.
– solver: the solver, to be chosen from ”L-BFGS-B”, ”CG” and ”Newton-CG”.
– maxiter: the maximum number of iterations.
• call (x, y=None, prob=None, norm=None, lam=None, solver=None,
maxiter=None, clip values=(0, 1)) -> np.ndarray
Notice that the labels y are not required. The other parameters are the same as for the
initializer.
6.9 Gaussian Data Augmentation
art.defences.GaussianAugmentation art/defences/gaussian augmentation.py
Gaussian data augmentation [44] is a standard data augmentation technique in computer vi-
sion that has also been used to improve the robustness of a model to adversarial attacks. This
method augments a dataset with copies of the original samples to which Gaussian noise has been
added. It can also be used to add Gaussian noise to an existing sample without augmentation.
An important advantage of this defence is its independence from the attack strategy. Its usage is
mostly intended for the augmentation of the training set.
Implementation details The GaussianAugmentation class extends the Preprocessor abstract
class. Applying this method does not require training, thus the fit function is a dummy. The
functions supported by this class are:
• init (sigma=1., augmentation=True, ratio=1.), having as parameters:
– sigma: the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise to be added to the samples.
– augmentation: if true, perform dataset augmentation using ratio, otherwise replace
samples with noisy counterparts.
– ratio: the augmentation ratio, i.e. how many adversarial samples to generate for each
original sample. A ratio of 1 will double the size of the dataset. This parameter is only
considered if augmentation is set to true.
• call (x, y=None, sigma=None, augmentation=None, ratio=None) ->
(np.ndarray, np.ndarray)
Notice that the labels y are not required, as the method does not apply any preprocessing
to them. If provided, they will be returned as the second object in the tuple; otherwise, a
single object containing the augmented version of x is returned. The other parameters are
the same as for the constructor.
The following example shows how to use GaussianAugmentation. Notice that the size of
the dataset doubles after processing. aug x contains all the original samples and their Gaussian
augmented copy. The order of the labels in aux y corresponds to that of aug x.
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In [1]: from keras.datasets import mnist
from art.defences import GaussianAugmentation
(x_train, y_train), (_, _) = mnist.load_data()
ga = GaussianAugmentation(sigma=.3)
aug_x, aug_y = ga(x_train, y_train)
print(x_train.shape, y_train.shape, aug_x.shape, aug_y.shape)
7 Evasion Detection
art.detection
This module fills the purpose of providing runtime detection methods for adversarial samples.
Currently, the library implements two types of detectors:
• art.detection.BinaryInputDetector: a detector based on opposing clean and adversarial
data at the input level (see Section 7.2).
• art.detection.BinaryActivationDetector a detector built based on the activation values
produced by a neural network classifier at a given internal layer (see Section 7.3).
The previous methods implement the API provided in the Detector base class, that we de-
scribe in the follwing.
7.1 The Detector Base Class
art.detection.Detector art/detection/detector.py
The Detector abstract class provides a unified interface for all runtime adversarial detection
methods. The class has the following public methods:
• fit(x, y=None, ∗∗kwargs) -> None
Fit the detector with the given data and parameters (where applicable).
• call (x) -> np.ndarray
Applies detection to the provided inputs and returns binary decisions for each input sample.
• is fitted
Check whether the detector has been fitted (where applicable).
7.2 Binary Detector Based on Inputs
art.detection.BinaryInputDetector art/detection/detector.py
This method builds a binary classifier, where the labels represent the fact the a given input is
adversarial (label 1) or not (label 0). The detector is fit with a mix of clean and adversarial data;
following this step, it is ready to detect adversarial inputs.
Implementation details The BinaryInputDetector implements the Detector abstract class. Its
constructor takes the following parameters:
• init (detector), where detector is a Classifier object and represents the architecture
that will be trained for detection.
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7.3 Binary Detector Based on Activations
art.poison detection.BinaryActivationDetector art/detection/detector.py
This method builds a binary classifier, where the labels represent the fact the a given input is
adversarial (label 1) or not (label 0). The activations detector is different from the previous one
in that it uses as inputs for training the values of the activations of a different classifier. Only
activations from one layer that is specified are used.
Implementation details The BinaryActivationDetector implements the Detector abstract
class. The method is initialized with the following parameters:
• init (classifier, detector, layer), where:
– classifier is a trained Classifier object; its activation values will be used for train-
ing the detector.
– detector is a Classifier object and represents the architecture that will be trained for
detection.
– layer represents the layer indice or layer name to be used for computing the activa-
tions of classifier.
8 Poisoning Detection
art.poison detection
Data used to train machine learning models are often collected from potentially untrustworthy
sources. This is particularly true for crowdsourced data (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk), social
media data, and data collected from user behavior (e.g. customer satisfaction ratings, purchasing
history, user traffic). Adversaries can craft inputs to modify the decision boundaries of machine
learning models to misclassify inputs or to reduce model performance.
As part of targeted misclassification attacks, recent work has shown that adversaries can gen-
erate “backdoors” or “trojans” into machine learning models by inserting malicious data into the
training set [18]. The resulting model performs very well on the intended training and testing
data, but behaves badly on specific attacker-chosen inputs. As an example, it has been demon-
strated that a network trained to identify street signs has strong performance on standard inputs,
but identifies stop signs as speed limit signs when a special sticker is added to the stop sign. This
backdoor provides adversaries a method for ensuring that any stop sign is misclassified simply
by placing a sticker on it. Unlike adversarial samples that require specific, complex noise to be
added to an image, backdoor triggers can be quite simple and can be easily applied to an image -
as easily as adding a sticker to a sign or modifying a pixel.
ART provides filtering defences to detect poison this type of attacks.
8.1 The PoisonFilteringDefence Base Class
art.poison detection.PoisonFilteringDefence art/poison detection/poison filtering defence.py
The abstract class PoisonFilteringDefence defines an interface for the detection of poison
when the training data is available. This class takes a model and its corresponding training data
and indentifies the set of data points that are suspected of being poisonous. The functions sup-
ported by this class are:
• init (self, classifier, x train, y train, verbose=True), where:
– classifier: corresponds to the trained model evaluated for poison
– x train: is the training data (features) used to train ‘classifier‘.
– y train: corresponds to the set of labels associate with x train.
30
– verbose: bool, ‘True‘ prints information about the analysis, by default it is set to ‘True‘.
• detect poison(self, **kwargs) -> ‘list‘
Here, kwargs are defence-specific parameters used by child classes. This function returns a
‘list‘ with items identified as poison.
• evaluate defence(self, is clean, **kwargs) -> JSON object
If ground truth is known, this function returns a confusion matrix in the form of a JSON
object. The parameters of this function are:
– is clean: 1-D array where is clean[i]=1 means x train[i] is clean and is clean[i]=0
that it is poisonous.
– kwargs: are defence-specific parameters used by child classes.
8.2 Poisoning Filter Using Activation Clustering Against Backdoor Attacks
art.poison detection.ActivationDefence art/poison detection/activation defence.py
The Activation Clustering [10] defence detects poisonous data crafted to insert backdoors into
neural networks. The intuition behind this method is that while backdoor and target samples
receive the same classification by the poisoned network, the reason why they receive this classi-
fication is different. In the case of standard samples from the target class, the network identifies
features in the input that it has learned correspond to the target class. In the case of backdoor
samples, it identifies features associated with the source class and the backdoor trigger, which
causes it to classify the input as the target class. This difference in mechanism should be evident
in the network activations, which represent how the network made its “decisions”. This intuition
is verified in Figure 1, which shows activations of the last hidden neural network layer for differ-
ent scenarios. Figure 1a shows the activations of the poisoned negative class for a neural network
trained on the Rotten Tomatoes movie reviews dataset. It is easy to see that the activations of the
poisonous and legitimate data break out into two distinct clusters. In contrast, Figure 1b displays
the activations of the positive class, which was not targeted with poison. Here we see that the
activations do not break out into two distinguishable clusters.
The Activation Clustering defence is formalized in Algorithm 8. As input, the algorithm takes
the data used to train the provided classifier. Each sample in the untrusted training set is clas-
sified and the activations of the last hidden layer are retained. These activations are segmented
according to their labels. For each activation segment, the dimensionality is reduced, and then a
clustering algorithm is applied. To cluster the activations, activations are reshaped into a 1D vec-
tor and a dimensionality reduction is performed using Independent Component Analysis (ICA),
which was found to be more effective than Principle Component Analysis (PCA). Dimensional-
ity reduction before clustering is necessary to avoid known issues with clustering on very high
dimensional data [2, 15].
k-means with k = 2 was found to be highly effective at separating the poisonous from legit-
imate activations. Other clustering methods were tested including DBSCAN, Gaussian Mixture
Models, and Affinity Propagation, but k-means was superior in terms of speed and accuracy.
However, k-means will separate the activations into two clusters, regardless of whether poison is
present or not. Thus, it is still necessary to determine which, if any, of the clusters corresponds to
poisonous data. Multiple clustering analysis techniques are implemented in this release including
relative cluster size, inter-cluster distance and cluster cohesiveness.
Analysts can also manually review the results using the visualization method included in
this release. An example visualization for MNIST dataset is presented in Figure 2. Here, the
library generated a sprite containing the images in each of the clusters generated by the Activation
Clustering defence for digit five. It is easy to see that one of the clusters contains a backdoor (fours
with a small dot in the bottom right). After poisonous data is identified, the model needs to be
repaired accordingly.
Implementation details The ActivationDefence class extends the PoisonFilteringDefence
abstract class. Hence, it uses its constructor:
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Activations of the last hidden layer projected onto the first 3 principle components. (a)
Activations of the poisoned class (d) Activations of the unpoisoned class.
Figure 2: Library visualization of clusters for class five produce by the Activation Clustering
defence (see code example below). Sprite in the left contains samples in the first cluster, while
sprite in the right contains samples in the second cluster. It is easy to see the second cluster
contains poison data.
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Algorithm 8 Backdoor Detection Activation Clustering Algorithm
Inputs: Dp := Untrusted training dataset with class labels {1, ..., n} and FΘP := Neural network
trained with Dp
1: Initialize A; A[i] holds activations for all si ∈ Dp such that FΘP(si) = i
2: for all s ∈ Dp do
3: As ← activations of last hidden layer of FΘP flattened into a single 1D vector
4: Append As to A[FΘP(s)]
5: end for
6: for all i = 0 to n do
7: red = reduceDimensions(A[i])
8: clusters = clusteringMethod(red)
9: analyzeForPoison(clusters)
10: end for
• init (self, classifier, x train, y train, verbose=True), where:
– classifier: corresponds to the trained model evaluated for poison
– x train: is the training data (features) used to train ‘classifier‘.
– y train: corresponds to the set of labels associate with x train.
• detect poison(self, **kwargs) -> ‘tuple’
The activation defence allows to set up the following parameters:
– clustering method: clustering algorithm to be used. Currently ‘KMeans‘ is the only
method supported.
– n clusters: number of clusters to find. This value needs to be greater or equal to one.
– reduce: method used to reduce dimensionality of the activations. Supported methods
include ‘PCA‘, ‘FastICA‘ and ‘TSNE‘.
– ndims: number dimensions to be reduced.
– cluster analysis: heuristic to automatically determine if a cluster contains poisonous
data. Supported methods include ‘smaller‘ and ‘distance‘. The ‘smaller‘ method de-
fines as poisonous the cluster with less number of data points, while the ‘distance‘
heuristic uses the distance between the clusters.
When an ActivationDefence is instantiated, the following parameters are used by default:
Dimensionality reduction is set to ‘PCA‘. The clustering method is set to ‘K-means‘ and the
number of clusters to two. The default dimensionality reduction technique is ‘PCA‘ and the
heuristic to analyze the cluster is ‘smaller‘ which assigns as poisonous the smaller cluster.
• visualize clusters(self, x raw, save=True, folder=’.’, **kwargs)
Given the images used to train the classifier before pre-processing, x raw, this function cre-
ates the sprite/mosaic visualization for clusters and returns the results in an array with
sprite images sprites by class, where sprites by class[i][j] contains the sprite of
class i cluster j. When save=True, it also stores a sprite (mosaic) per cluster in ART’s
DATA PATH. If a folder is specified, a folder will be created in ART’s DATA PATH and
the files generated will be stored in it.
• evaluate defence(self, is clean) -> JSON object
If ground truth is known, this function returns a confusion matrix in the form of a JSON
object. Here, is clean: 1-D array where is clean[i]=1 means x train[i] is clean and
is clean[i]=0 that it is poisonous.
The following example shows how to use ActivationDefence.
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In [ ]: from keras.models import load_model
from art.classifiers import KerasClassifier
from art.poison_detection import ActivationDefence
from art.utils import load_mnist
(x_train, y_train), (_, _), _, _ = load_mnist()
model = load_model('keras_model.h5')
classifier = KerasClassifier((0, 1), model=model)
defence = ActivationDefence(classifier, x_train, y_train)
confidence_level, is_clean_lst = defence.detect_poison(n_clusters=2, ndims=10,
reduce="PCA")
confusion_matrix = defence.evaluate_defence(is_clean_lst)
sprites_by_class = defence.visualize_clusters(x_train, save=False)
plot_class_clusters(5, 2) # Resulting plots shown in Figure 2
def plot_class_clusters(n_class, n_clusters):
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
for q in range(n_clusters):
plt.figure(1, figsize=(25,25))
plt.tight_layout()
plt.subplot(1, n_clusters, q+1)
plt.title("Class "+ str(n_class)+ ", Cluster "+ str(q), fontsize=40)
sprite = sprites_by_class[n_class][q]
plt.imshow(sprite, interpolation='none')
Finally, it is possible to take the clusters generated by the defence and inspect them manually
as illustrated by the previous example.
9 Metrics
art.metrics
For assessing the robustness of a classifier against adversarial attacks, possible metrics are:
the average minimal perturbation that is required to get an input misclassified; the average sensi-
tivity of the model’s loss function with respect to changes in the inputs; the average sensitivity of
the model’s logits with respect to changes in the inputs, e.g. based on Lipschitz constants in the
neighborhood of sample inputs. The art.metrics module implements several metrics to assess
the robustness respectively vulnerability of a given classifier, either generally or with respect to
specific attacks:
• Empirical robustness (see Section 9.1)
• Loss sensitivity (see Section 9.2)
• CLEVER score (see Section 9.3).
9.1 Empirical Robustness
art.metrics.empirical robustness art/metrics.py
Empirical robustness assesses the robustness of a given classifier with respect to a specific
attack and test data set. It is equivalent to the average minimal perturbation that the attacker
needs to introduce for a successful attack, as introduced in [31]. Given a trained classifier C(x),
an untargeted attack ρ(x) and test data samples X = (x1, . . . , xn), let I be the subset of indices
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} for which C(ρ(xi)) 6= C(xi), i.e. for which the attack was successful. Then the
empirical robustness (ER) is defined as:
ER(C, ρ,X) =
1
|I|∑i∈I
‖ρ(xi)− xi‖p
‖xi‖p .
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Here p is the norm used in the creation of the adversarial samples (if applicable); the default value
is p = 2.
Implementation details The method for calculating the empirical robustness has the following
signature:
empirical robustness(classifier, x, attack name, attack params=None) -> float.
It returns the empirical robustness value as defined above. The input parameters are as fol-
lows:
• classifier: The classifier C(x) to be assessed.
• x: An np.ndarray with the test data X.
• attack name: A string specifying the attack ρ to be used. Currently, the only supported
attack is ‘fgsm’ (Fast Gradient Sign Method, see Section 5.2).
• attack params: A dictionary with attack-specific parameters. If the attack has a norm at-
tribute, then this is used as the p in the calculation above; otherwise the standard Euclidean
distance is used (p = 2).
9.2 Loss Sensitivity
art.metrics.loss sensitivity art/metrics.py
Local loss sensitivity aims to quantify the smoothness of a model by estimating its Lipschitz
continuity constant, which measures the largest variation of a function under a small change in
its input: the smaller the value, the smoother the function. This measure is estimated based on
the gradients of the classifier logits, as considered e.g. in [23]. It is thus an attack-independent
measure offering insight on the properties of the model.
Given a classifier C(x) and a test set X = (x1, . . . , xn), the loss sensitivity (LS) is defined as
follows:
LS(C,X, y) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∥∥∇L(xi, yi)∥∥2.
Implementation details The method for calculating the loss sensitivity has the signature that
follows and returns the loss sensitivity as defined above.
loss sensitivity(classifier, x, y) -> float, where:
• classifier is the classifier C(x) to be assessed
• x is an np.ndarray with the test data X
• y is an np.ndarray with the one-hot encoded labels of X.
9.3 CLEVER
art.metrics.clever u
art.metrics.clever t art/metrics.py
The Cross Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness metric (CLEVER) [42] estimates,
for a given input x and `p norm, a lower bound γ for the minimal perturbation that is required to
change the classification of x, i.e. ‖x− x′‖p < γ implies C(x) = C(x′) (see Corollary 3.2.2 in [42]).
The derivation of γ is based on a Lipschitz constant for the gradients of the classifier’s logits in
an `p-ball with radius R around x. Since in general there is no closed-form expression or upper
bound for this constant‡, the CLEVER algorithm uses an estimate based on extreme value theory.
‡Closed-form expressions for special types of classifier are derived in [20], which is the first work considering Lips-
chitz bounds for deriving formal guarantees of classifiers robustness against adversarial inputs.
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Algorithm 9 outlines the calculation of the CLEVER metric for targeted attacks: given a target
class y, the score γ is constructed such that C(x′) 6= y as long as ‖x− x′‖p < γ. Below we discuss
how to adapt the algorithm to the untargeted case. A key step in the algorithm is outlined in
lines 5-6 where the norm of gradient differences is evaluated at points randomly sampled from
the uniform distribution on the `p-ball with radius R around x. The set Smax collects the maximum
norms from nbatch batches of size nsample each (line 8), and µˆ is the MLE of the location parameter µ
of a reverse Weibull distribution given the realizations in S. The final CLEVER score is calculated
in line 11. Note that it is bounded by the radius R of the `p-ball, as for any larger perturbations
the estimated Lipschitz constant might not apply.
The CLEVER score for untargeted attacks is simply obtained by taking the minimum CLEVER
score for targeted attacks over all classes y ∈ Y with y 6= C(x).
Algorithm 9 CLEVER score for targeted attack
Input:
x: Input for which to calculate the CLEVER score
y: Target class
nbatch: Number of batches over each of which the maximum gradient is computed
nsample: Number of samples per batch
p: Perturbation norm
R: Maximum `p norm of perturbations considered in the CLEVER score
1: Smax ← {}
2: q← p/(p− 1)
3: for i = 1, . . . , nbatch do
4: for j = 1, . . . , nsample do
5: xj ← Bp(x, R)
6: bj ← ‖∇ZC(x)(xi)−∇Zy(xj)‖q
7: end for
8: Smax ← Smax ∪ {maxj bj}
9: end for
10: µˆ← MLEWeibull(Smax)
11: γ← min{(ZC(x)(x)− Zy(x))/µˆ, R}
Output:
CLEVER score γ.
Implementation details The method for calculating the CLEVER score for targeted attacks has
the following signature:
clever t(classifier, x, target class, nb batches, batch size, radius, norm,
c init=1, pool factor=10) -> float.
Consider its parameters:
• classifier, x and target class are respectively the classifier C(x), the input x and the
target class y for which the CLEVER score is to be calculated.
• nb batches and batch size are the number of batches nbatch and batch size nsample, respec-
tively.
• radius is the radius R.
• norm is the perturbation norm p.
• c init is a hyper-parameter for the MLE computation in line 10 (which is using the
weibull min function from scipy.stats).
• pool factor is an integer factor according to which a pool of pool factor×nsample random
samples from the `p-ball with radius R and center x is created and (re-)used in lines 5-6 for
computational efficiency purposes.
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The method clever u for calculating the CLEVER score of untargeted attacks has the same
signature as clever t except that it does not take the target class parameter.
10 Data Generators
art.data generators.DataGenerator
art.data generators.KerasDataGenerator
art.data generators.MXDataGenerator
art.data generators.PyTorchDataGenerator art/data generators.py
The DataGenerator interface provides a standardized way for incorporating data loader and
generators. These are most useful when working with large datasets that do not fit into memory
and that are loaded one batch at a time. Another use case for this interface is when performing
data augmentation on the fly for each batch. Users can define their own generators performing
loading or data augmentation, that can be subsequently used with the fit generator functions
available in the Classifier and in the AdversarialTrainer. The DataGenerator interface con-
sists of one function:
• get batch() -> (np.ndarray, np.ndarray)
This function retrieves the next batch of data in the form of (x, y).
The library provides a few standard wrappers for framework-specific data loaders, that we de-
scribe in the rest of this section. All of them implement the DataGenerator interface.
Keras data generator This wrapper supports the following generator types allowed by Keras:
Python generator functions, sequences (keras.utils.Sequence) and image data generators
(keras.preprocessing.image.ImageDataGenerator). The signature of the init function is as fol-
lows:
• init (generator, size, batch size), where:
– generator is a generator from one of the types specified above.
– size is the total number of instances in the dataset that the generator can provide.
– batch size is the size of each batch that the generator will provide.
When using this wrapper with the fit generator function of the Keras classifier wrapper,
training will be delegated to Keras by actually calling its fit generator directly with the gener-
ator object.
MXNet data generator This class provides a wrapper on top of the
mxnet.gluon.data.DataLoader type. The signature of its init function is as follows:
• init (data loader, size, batch size), where:
– data loader is a Gluon DataLoader instance.
– size is the total number of instances in the dataset that the loader can provide.
– batch size is the size of each batch that the loader will provide.
PyTorch data generator This class provides a wrapper on top of the
torch.utils.data.DataLoader type. The signature of its init function is as follows:
• init (data loader, size, batch size), where:
– data loader is a PyTorch DataLoader instance.
– size is the total number of instances in the dataset that the loader can provide.
– batch size is the size of each batch that the loader will provide.
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11 Versioning
The library uses semantic versioning*, meaning that version numbers take the form of MA-
JOR.MINOR.PATCH. Given such a version number, we increment the
• MAJOR version when we make incompatible API changes,
• MINOR version when we add functionality in a backwards-compatible manner, and
• PATCH version when we make backwards-compatible bug fixes.
Consistent benchmark results can be obtained with ART under constant MAJOR.MINOR ver-
sions. Please report these when publishing experiments.
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